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This article proposes to uncover another motivation behind the introduction of
antidumping duties through the interaction between a Northern rm, a Southern
one and an administering authority in charge of setting an antidumping procedure.
The goods from the South are assumed to be ethically unsound while those from
the North are ethically sound. Both rms compete on price in order to satisfy
the demand of the North. We show that a smear campaign engaged by the do-
mestic rm may inuence the antidumping duty by reducing the credence of the
consumers in the Southern good. Moreover it can discourage the foreign rm to ac-
tively cooperate in the antidumping investigation and this reaction of the Southern
rm may increase the antidumping duty.
JEL Classications: F1, F12, F13, F16
Keywords: Antidumping, Facts available, Social quality, Smear campaign, Ethics,
Protectionism.
1 Introduction
Since the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) creation, the world trading
system has beneted from multilateral trade liberalization. Taris, subsidies or quotas
are from now on more controlled or even denitively prohibited by The World Trade
Organization (WTO). Nevertheless trade liberalization under GATT/WTO is not with-
out exceptions. Actually, article VI of GATT stipulates that antidumping duties are
authorized: members are allowed to set up a duty on a foreign product that is im-
ported at below-normal value and causes material injury to a domestic industry. This
tari is equal to the dumping margin. The cumulative number of antidumping, global
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1safeguard, China-specic transitional safeguard and countervailing duties throughout
the rst three quarters of 2009 is 30.3% higher than the number of requests that took
place in the rst three quarters of 2008 (Bown 2009a).These policies seem to replace
traditional trade policies (Blonigen and Prusa, 2003; Bown, 2009a, and Matschke and
Sch ottner, 2009). Among these policies, antidumping duty is the preferred trade rem-
edy of choice. The main problem linked to this antidumping rise consists in a prominent
risk of a new protectionism since it "allows considerable discretion over when and how
to implement this policy" (Khatibi, 2009) and any studies show that article VI can
often be used to nd pricing below normal value (Blonigen, 2006).
In this context many articles stress that antidumping duties are used to pursue
strategic trade policies (Cheng et al., 2001, Matschke and Sch ottner, 2009, Staiger and
Wolak, 1989 and Webb, 1992) given that they are most often applied in oligopolistic
industries1. These industries (like steel industry, drugs sectors or textile industry) are
well organized2 and are inuential lobbies. The dumping margin is calculated thanks
to an investigation initiated by the home rm aected by this unfair behavior.This
procedure seems to legitimate lobbies acts which tend to protect their sector. The ability
of domestic rms to manipulate the antidumping process to their own advantage is not
new in the literature and political economy aspect of antidumping is notably developed
by Anderson (1994) and Moore and Suranovic (1992) or Rosendor (1996)3.
Another part of the antidumping literature deals with the decision to participate
in the investigation. The rm which is suspected of dumping has to cooperate in the
investigations nevertheless, this cooperation implies any costs (the compliance costs
described by Moore, 20054). First, it can lead into paradoxical position in which the
suspected of dumping rm refuses to contribute to the investigations. This refusal could
be expensive for it, because it leads to enforce the "facts available" rule. This rule allows
the authority in charge of administrating the antidumping duty, to tax the incriminated
good, considering only the informations provided by the home rm (Moore, 2005 and
Tand e, 2005)56. Then rms may be taxed whereas there is no dumping or they can
be excessively punished (Boltucck and Litan, 1991). Moore (2005) explains this non
participation in negotiations. He even shows, it can make this choice without making
dumping. Problems seem to be due to a lack of information on the foreign rm, a
diculty to evaluate the dumping margin and diverse costs linked to the informations
revelation7.
In the light of this literature on strategic trade policy and on political aspect of an-
tidumping, this paper proposes to uncover another motivation behind the introduction
of antidumping duties by linking North-South trade and the social element of goods
from the South. We construct a North-South duopoly model, where the goods imported
in the home (North) country from the foreign (South) country may be \ethically un-
sound" (Cassagnard and Cardebat, 2010). Code of ethics is dicult to observe since
2the producer is alone in knowing its ethical level. Then goods ethically dierentiated
are bought on trust as the consumer is subjected to strongly asymmetric information
(Darby and Karni, 1973). Like quality dierentiation models (Mussa and Rosen, 1978),
the demand side consists of a continuum of consumers with a specic sensitivity to eth-
ical concerns. We show, it exists an optimal antidumping duty, which enforces taris
all the more high as the uncertainty in its social quality of the good is high. The
dumping margin lays on the sensitivity of the consumers to ethical concerns and on the
uncertainty concerning the social quality of the imported good.
Moreover we assume that the rm in the home country can engage in a smear
campaign8 to inuence the nal level of the antidumping duty. By doing so the home
rm may discourage the foreign one to participate in the antidumping investigation.
Consequently, the Northern rm benets from a new mean to aect the antidumping
duty level. It is eectively able to aect in a negative way the consumers' credence
via a negative campaign. This campaign reduces the consumers' trust on the Southern
good and it increases the optimal antidumping duty. If the foreign rm does not ac-
tively cooperate with the investigating authority, the \facts available" provided by the
domestic petitioning rm will be used to assess the dumping margin, which will then be
higher than otherwise. The complaining rm will not be induced to completely destroy
the image of the Southern rm. It would imply a collaboration of this rm to the in-
vestigation which would restore the truth and reduce a lot (or cancel) the antidumping
margin.An optimal defamation level maximizes the Northern rm benets and explains
in a new way the non cooperation of the Southern rm in the antidumping procedure
investigations. It gives another explanation of the high dumping margins described by
Baldwin and Moore (1991). It also conrms that the antidumping procedure generates
"directly unproductive prots" (Bhagwati,1982 and developed among others by Hill-
man, Katz and Rosenberg, 1987, Ethier and Fisher,1987, Leidy and Hoekman, 1990
and 1991).
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical framework and resolves the game to nd the equilibrium outcomes. In
section 3, we introduce the smear campaign and we evaluate the eect of this tactic on
the decision of the Southern rm to collaborate in the investigations.
2 Modelling Framework
Timing of the Game
I propose a three-stage game among an administering authority, a domestic rm,
and a foreign rm:
 Firstly, the Northern rm propagates a smear campaign against the Southern
good9. This campaign reduces the subjective probability that the good from the
3South is ethical. This campaign also permits the domestic rm to positively im-
pact the level of antidumping duty. It is the \facts available" tari. This tari
is imposed on the foreign rm if the domestic rm wins the petition and if the
foreign rm refuses to cooperate.
 Next, the Southern rm decides whether to cooperate to the antidumping petition
or not.
 Thirdly, if the Southern rm cooperates, a compliance cost (K) is imposed by an
administering authority with certainty and an antidumping duty (tA) is imposed
with some positive probability (). The compliance cost is associated with pro-
viding legal fees and various informations and the authority is assumed to care
about both consumer welfare and domestic producer welfare. If the Southern rm
refuses to cooperate, then the duty (tF) is based on the domestic rm's allega-
tion with some positive probability (). I assume (like Moore 2005)  and  are
exogenous and that  > .10
Both rms compete on price in order to satisfy the demand in the North. Their out-
puts are imperfect substitutes in the domestic market and are produced using constant
marginal cost production technologies. They are distinguished by their code of ethics
in production, according to Armington (1969), by place of production. We assume
that imperfect substitution comes from ethical dierentiation and that consumers are
distinguished by their degree of ethical consideration.
The model is solved by backward induction. Like Moore (2005), the foreign rm
will cooperate if the expected prots under cooperation are greater than under non-
cooperation.Thanks to a negative campaign, the Northern rm modies the optimal
antidumping duty (tF), knowing the decision rule of the foreign rm. On the one hand,
if tF is too high, then the foreign rm will cooperate and the duty will be lower or
perhaps equal to zero. On the other hand, if tF is set up too low, then the foreign
rm may prefer not to cooperate. The smear campaign permits the Northern rm to
bias tF, knowing the compliance cost and the consumer's credence in the foreign good.
Figure 1 depicts this game by using its extensive form.
Consumers Behaviors
The following features of the model are standard in quality dierentiation models.
The demand side consists of a continuum of consumers g 2]0;1[. g represents the
consumer's sensitivity to ethical concerns: a low value means a low level of sensitivity
to ethics and inversely for high values of g. One and only one consumer exists for every
value of g and each one buys at most one product.
Assume two levels of utility for the Northern consumers: the utility of consuming a
good produced by the Northern rm (Un) and the utility of consuming a good produced
4Figure 1: Extensive Form of the Game
by the Southern rm (Us).The utility of consuming the Southern good is positively
related to g and  2 [0;1];  is the ethical dierentiation parameter, it represents the
consumer's credence in the Southern good. Then  can be interpreted as the subjective
probability (from the consumer's point of view) the Southern good sounds ethically.
Let us nally consider an exogeneous ethical level (" > 0) which represents the social
quality of the good. u is an exogenous positive constant.
P is the price of the Southern product and P is the price of the Northern product;
these prices are such that P > P. Starred letters refer to Southern variables. Assume
that the Northern good is systematically sound ethically whereas the Southern one is
unsound ethically: as for the consumers, Southern goods are always less ethical than the
Northern ones. The dierence between the utilities and the price of the corresponding
good gives two consumer surplus (CS and CS):
CS = U   P = u + g"   P (1)
CS = U   P = u + g"   P
e g is the marginal consumer who is indierent to consuming the Southern good and
consuming the Northern one.




5Then the following condition must be satised in order for the marginal consumer
to fall in the feasible range [0;1].
Condition: e g 2 [0;1] , P   P 6 "(1   )
Then, we obtain the demands adressed to the rms. To simplify the model, we as-
sume there is no marginal consumer who is indierent between consuming the Southern
good and no consuming this good: D = e g and D = 1   e g
Producers Behavior
What follows describes the prots of the Southern rm () and the Northern rm
().
 = (P   (c + t))D (3)
 = (P   1)D
We assume that c < 1, it is the marginal cost of production of the Southern rm.
The marginal cost in the North is normalized to 1: t is the antidumping duty set by
the administering authority. In the last stage, each rm chooses the prices in order to
maximize its prot. Thus, Nash equilibrium prices with an antidumping duty and the
non cooperation of the Southern rm in the antidumping investgations are:
P
F =




2 + c + tF + 2"(1   )
3
(5)
In this case, the tari tF is the "facts available" duty implemented by the authority.
We assume that the noncooperation induces a lower credence of the consumers ( <
) because the Northern rm engages a smear campaign which reduces this credence
to obtain the highest antidumping duty.
If the Southern rm accepts to cooperate then Nash equilibrium prices are
P
A =




2 + c + tA + 2"(1   )
3
(7)
We assume that this cooperation increases the credence of the Northern consumer with
respect to . The antidumping duty tA implemented in this case is calculated in the
next subsection. In addition there are two price pairs under free trade. As before, the
cooperation implies a higher credence ( > ) whereas the noncooperation implies a
lower credence (); Under cooperation the Nash equilibrium prices are
P
C =




2 + c + 2"(1   )
3
6And under noncooperation we have:
P
NC =




2 + c + 2"(1   )
3
Higher dierentiation decreases the Southern price and reduces the competition be-
tween the both rms. From these equilibrium prices we can easily calculate the other
equilibrium values.
The market equilibrium






1   (c + tA)
3"(1   )
=







1   (c + tA)
3"(1   )
=
 1 + (c + tA) + 2"(1   )
3"(1   )
(11)
Higher dierentiation decreases the demand which is addressed to the Southern
rm because higher dierentiation implies lower credence of the consumers. tA raises








 1 + c + 2"(1   )
3"(1   )
: (13)
The non-cooperative demands with the antidumping duty tF are:
D
F =




 1 + (c + tF) + 2"(1   )
3"(1   )
: (15)
In this case but under free trade we have:
D
NC =




 1 + c + 2"(1   )
3"(1   )
: (17)
The following table brings together the consumer's surplus in each case
7Table 1: Consumer's surplus at the equilibrium
Outcome Domestic Foreign
(Probability) consumer's surplus consumer's surplus
Foreign Firm Free Trade () 3 2
2 "D2





Cooperation antidumping (1-) 3 2
2 "D2





Foreign Firm Free Trade ()
3 2
2 "D2






Non Cooperation antidumping (1-)
3 2
2 "D2






Global Welfare and Optimal Tari
Like strategic trade policy literature, I assume that the trade authority cares about
both consumer and domestic producer welfare (W):





(1   c)2   t2
"(1   )




= 0 , c tF1 = "(1   ) or c tA1 = "(1   )
c tF and b tA are the optimal antidumping duties if the authority also cares about the
consumers11. They are positively related to " and negatively related to :
Proposition 1 If the administering authority in charge of setting an antidumping pro-
cedure cares about both consumer and domestic producer welfare, then the optimal an-
tidumping duty (b t) is positively related to the level of ethics required in the North (")
and negatively related to the consumer's credence () such as b t = "(1   ):
3 "Facts Available" and Smear Campaign
The Southern rm's decision
Foreign cost of production and ethical considerations are privately held information
of the exporter, consequently the Southern rm needs an incentive to cooperate in the
investigation. Moore (2005) explains that this incentive depends on the potential use
of the fact available method: the Northern rm will probably overstate the dumping
margin thus the Southern one would face high duty if it refuses to cooperate and lower
credence of the consumers. On the one hand, cooperation permits the Southern rm to
improve the credence of the Northern consumers but it implies for the Southern rm
an additional cost of cooperation. Like Moore (2005) we assume that if the Southern
rm cooperates with the investigation, it incurs constant compliance costs (K). On the
other hand, the "facts available" rule increases the dumping margin and reduces the
credence of the consumers in the Southern good. The following table brings together
the prots at the equilibrium12
8Table 2: Prots at the equilibrium
Outcome Domestic Foreign
(Probability) Prot Prot
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Figure 2 depicts two numerical examples, with  = 0:6 and  = 0:4;c = 0:4 and
" = 0:35, to understand the foreign rm's decision. This graph permits us to see that
without K the foreign rm will cooperate if  < : In this example  = 0:4 if  > 0:4
the Southern rm prefers to cooperate. Introducing compliance costs, this threshold is
modied and with K = 0:1 it is nearly equal to 0:6. Thanks to the second graph, with
 <  the Southern rm prefers to cooperate with a lower :







() e  =
 9(E(
nc) + K) + 2(1   c + ") +
p
(9(E(
nc) + K)   2(1   c))2   4(1   c)2
2"
e  > 0 ,
q
(9(E(
nc) + K)   2(1   c))2   4(1   c)2 > 9(E(
nc) + K) + 2(1   c + ")
which is always veried.
Proposition 2 Southern rm's decision
If  <  and K > 0 there exist a threshold
e  =
 9(E(
nc) + K) + 2(1   c + ") +
p
(9(E(
nc) + K)   2(1   c))2   4(1   c)2
2"
9Figure 2: The Southern Firm Decision: Numerical Examples
10 such as E(
coop)   E(
nc) = 0
{ if  < e  then the Southern rm does not want to cooperate
{ if  = e  then the Southern rm is indierent to cooperating or not to
cooperating.
{ if  > e  the Southern rm accept to cooperate.
 A raise of the compliance costs induces a higher threshold e  and then a lower
incentive to cooperate with the antidumping investigation14.
 The smear campaign implies a decrease of the consumer's credence () which
implies an increase of e : The smear campaign urges the Southern rm to coop-
erate15.
The Northern rm's decision
What follows describes the optimal smear campaign of the Northern rm. As ex-
pected the Northern rm will always prefer the non cooperation case because the prob-
ability to be protected by an antidumping duty is higher and because it allows the case
to proceed "facts available" which means higher antidumping duty. Then the Northern




[2"(1   )   1 + c]
2
9"(1   )
+ (1   )




[2"(1   )   1 + c]
2
9"(1   )
+ (1   )




Then knowing the threshold e  is enough to solve the Northern rm's program.
Proposition 3 If  <  and  <  then for a given  >  the Northern rm will
always prefer the non cooperative case (the lowest  because
@E()
@ < 016 and the lowest
 because
@E()
@ < 017). Consequently the Northern rm will choose the lowest  which
insure the non cooperation of the Southern rm.
Finally the program of the Northern rm will be very simple since it will engage
a smear campaign to set  which maximize its prots. Now we know that this rm
always prefers the lowest  nevertheless if  is too low the Northern rm will prefer
to cooperate with the antidumping investigations. Consequently, the solution of this
11Figure 3: Decisions of the Northern Firm and the Southern One: Numerical Example
program is easy to nd: the Northern rm will reduce consumer's credence in the
Southern good. This reduction implies an increase of e . So knowing  the Northern
rm must set the lowest  which insure the non cooperation of its rival.
Figure 3 depicts a numerical application with c = 0:5; " = 0:5;  = 0:5;  = 0:2;
= 0:2 which presents the decisions of the both rms. In this example, the threshold
is equal to e  = 0:25. Knowing  = 0:24, the Northern rm can engage a negative
campaigning so as to decrease  from =0:24 to  = 0:2. This campaign modies
the Southern rm's behaviour because it prefers from now not to cooperate. Without
cooperation, the prot of the Northern rm increases from 0:07 to nearly 0:1.
4 Conclusion
The aim of this article is to uncover another explanation of the introduction of an-
tidumping duties and to explain dierently the non cooperation of some rms in the
investigations. With a new theoretical framework where the goods imported in the
North may be ethically unsound, we show that the dumping margin calculus may rest
on the subjective probability (from the consumer's point of view) the Southern good
unsounds ethically. In this case, the Northern rm can engage in a smear campaign to
inuence the nal level of the antidumping duty and this negative campaign can dis-
courage the foreign rm to actively cooperate in the antidumping investigation. This
reaction of the foreign rm will probably increase the nal antidumping duty.
Thanks to this article we are obliged to deepen more these antidumping procedures,
particularly in an economic context, where protectionism pressures become strong. Pro-
tectionism is regularly presented in political debates to palliate environmental consid-
erations divergences (environmental dumping) or denounce the "poor" "social quality"
12of importing goods (social dumping) and developed countries' antidumping measures
are essentially directed to developing countries. A new thought is thus opened about
trade policies menus apt to reveal the hidden information by the rm from the South
and to incite the Northern rm to divulge also the true information.
5 Appendixes
Appendix 1
Table 3: Prices and Taris at the equilibrium
Outcome Tari Domestic Foreign
(Probability) Price Price
























Table 4: Demands at the equilibrium
Outcome Domestic Foreign
(Probability) Demand Demand

























































coop) is increasing in  and . So, the non cooperation of the rm implies a lower 
and a lower probability  and consequently a lower expected prot if we do not consider
K.
Appendix 3
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It is satised with the previous condition.
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Notes
1WTO reports that during the second half of 2008 the goods aected by the AD procedure were
in the base metals sector (43 initiations), the chemicals sector (22 initiations), textiles sector (19
initiations) and plastic and rubber sector (14 initiations)(Source http://www.wto.org).
2Antidumping initiation implies that at least 50% of the domestic industry is not oppose the petition.
3More generally, taris determined by lobbying is quite ordinary in trade policy litterature (see for
example Mayer (1984), Rodrik (1986 and 1995), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Goldberg and Maggi
(1999), Mitra and Panagariya (2004) or Bandyopadhyay and al. (2008).
4For example, US Department of Commerce set high compliance costs described by Murray (1991),
Palmeter (1991) and Finger and Artis (1993): 200-page questionnaires, tight and inexible deadlines,
specic style to report data. Moreover if the foreign rms is partially cooperative then all the informa-
tions provided will not be used.
5Bandyopadhyay (2008) gives more details on the american antidumping procedure.
6During the period 1980-1990, the American Department of Trade's use of \facts available" leads
to dumping margins that are 38% higher than the average 29% margin. (Baldwin and Moore, 1991)
7Hansen and Prusa (1996) and Gupta and Panagariya (2006) propose another explanation: the
presence of many exporters increases the free-rider problem and then it urges the rms to invest less
17on defense.Consequently, injury nding is positively related to the number of defendants.
8China's products were the most frequent subject to new antidumping measures in 2008 (41% of the
120 new measures) (Bown, 2009b). In addition, negative campaigns have underlined serious problems
concerning chinese products: defective chineses tires, tainted pet food, toothpaste manufactured with
a toxic chemical and toys coated with lead paint...
9To simplify we assume that this campaign is not costly for the Northern rm and there is no
uncertainty concerning the success of this campaign.
10Like Moore (2005), we assume that if the Southern rm accept to cooperate in the investigations
then the administering authority will less severe. By withholding informations, the southern rm
decreases the probability of winning the petition compared with the cooperative case. Even if this as-
sumption seems to be obvious, Murray (1991), Palmeter (1991) and Lindsey (1999) argue it is probably
not consistent with the US department of commerce procedure. Nonetheless, Blonigen (2003) claims it
is not a "serious criticism" of Moore's model.
11Consumers' interests are not mentioned in the WTO Antidumping Code. Considering the case




0 , c tF2 =
1
4[1 c+7"(1 )] or c tA2 =
1
4[1 c+7"(1 )] . Unsurprisingly, the optimal tari without
considering consumers'intersests will be higher. In this case, the sensibility of the anti-dumping duty
to " and to  is also higher and the following conclusions will not change.
12The prices and the demands at the equilibrium are in the appendix of this paper.
13Proof in appendix 2.
14Proof in appendix 3.
15Proof in appendix 4.
16Proof in appendix 5.
17Proof in appendix 5.
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